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20-06-2026
TEHRAN: Iran’s leadership is trying to present its emerging memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the US not as a retreat but as the result of resistance and victory. That is not an easy argument to make.
The country has just gone through a damaging war, the economy is under severe pressure, and parts of the Islamic Republic’s own support base have spent months denouncing any compromise with Washington.
There are also Iranians, both inside the country and abroad, who see the crisis not as a moment for diplomacy but as an opportunity for regime change.
This is the divided political landscape in which Tehran is now trying to sell the deal.
Senior Iranian officials have framed the deal as a win. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the Speaker of parliament and the leading Iranian figure in the talks, said Iran had taken “a long step towards final victory”.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has described the understanding as potentially transformative, saying that if fully implemented it could resolve many of Iran’s problems and create “a different world” in Iran and the Middle East.
Qalibaf’s role is significant because he is not identified with Pezeshkian’s moderate camp; his public support suggests the deal has backing from more powerful parts of the system even within Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards.
The leadership is also presenting the agreement as a victory because, in Tehran’s argument, the US and Israel failed to achieve their main objectives.
They did not force Iran into surrender, did not remove the Islamic Republic from power, did not end Iran’s nuclear program through military action, and did not break Iran’s links to Hezbollah.
Instead, Iran is still at the negotiating table, with Lebanon included in the framework and sanctions relief being discussed but this official narrative is contested inside Iran. One hard-line MP, the deputy chair of parliament’s National Security Committee, has reportedly described the draft deal as a document that would turn Iran into an American colony.
He also accused negotiators of ignoring the supreme leader’s directive not to re-open the Strait of Hormuz to shipping.
That criticism matters because it does not come from outside the system. It comes from within one of the institutions meant to oversee national security.
For months, hardline voices in parliament, state-aligned media and nightly pro-government gatherings have argued that the US cannot be trusted.
They point to the fact that diplomacy was still taking place shortly before the war began, and say the Trump administration used negotiations as cover while Israel and the US prepared military action. For them, any deal with Washington risks looking like appeasement.
Yet some of these voices appear quieter now. That may suggest that the decision to proceed has been authorized from the highest levels of the state. It does not mean there is full unity.
It might suggest that, for now, the centre of power has judged that the cost of rejecting a deal may be greater than the cost of absorbing hardline anger.
Iran’s leadership may present the agreement as the result of military leverage, including pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on US and regional energy interests but the economy has also forced Tehran’s hand.
The war, sanctions, restrictions on shipping, reduced access to oil markets and hard currency and very high inflation have all squeezed the country and ordinary Iranians. For many families, the question is not whether the agreement sounds like victory, but whether it lowers prices and reduces fear of another round of war. (Int’l Monitoring Desk)
